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ABSTRACT 
An important hallmark of the 1994 Uruguay round of trade talks was the inclusion of the 
protection of the of intellectual property rights across international borders by the WTO. 
This piece of legislation has helped put pressure on countries to reduce piracy in goods 
such as computer software. Yet it has had unintended adverse effect on developing 
countries especially the least developed countries. This paper uses price discrimination 
among countries as a way of solving lack of access to essential patented goods such as 
pharmaceuticals. One of the goals of World Trade organization (WTO) is to accelerate 
economic development in developing countries through International Trade. Drawing on 
this background, this paper explores avenues through which TRIPS would be less 




A notable feature of the 1995 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was 
the protection of Trade Related Aspects oflntellectual Prope1ty Rights (TRIPS). Hitherto, 
enhancement in trade in goods and services, through tariff reduction among its members, was 
the main focus of the various trade negotiations under General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GA TI). The 1995 agreement gave the World Trade Organization (WTO) a legal 
framework to enforce rules governing intellectual property. 
Intel lectual Property Rights (IPR) refers to ownership of non-physical assets such as 
trademarks, patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. Patents are issued by a government to an 
individual or entity for the possession of the sole right to prevent others from commercial 
exploitation of an invention. Copyright refers to the ri ght of writers, photographers, 
filmmakers, and other owners of artistic works to exclude unauthorized people to reproduce 
their works for commercial purpose. A trademark is a symbol, a sign, a word, or a 
combination of these. The holder of a trademark is the only authorized person to use it for 
commercial purpose. A firm in possession of a trade secret uses a kind of technique, a device 
or a method of production to gain advantage over other firms in the industry. 
The basic underlying idea of IPR is that the innovator must enjoy the fruit of his 
labor. Tangible goods are not difficult to produce but due to the costs that go into research 
and development (R and D) to produce a tangible good, the innovator must be given the right 
to recoup the cost of invention. 
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The concept of IPR has been in existence for centuries in Europe and North America. 
But it is a re latively new concept in Asia and Africa. Asia and Af1ica have community 
ownershjp of property whereas the western world encourages individualism. The ill-defined 
property ri ghts in Asian and African countries meant that the push for TRIPS would come 
from the West. Prior to the adoption of the TRIPS by the World Trade Organizati on (WTO) 
in 1994, The United States had its own Jaws that were aimed at curbing imitation and piracy 
that were on the rise in countries in the former Soviet Union and China. The United States 
Congress passed a law that became known as Section 30 l . This law authoiized the United 
States to impose trade sanctions on any country suspected of patent or copyright violation. In 
December 1994 the government of the Uni ted States and China nearly started a trade war due 
to continual copyright violation by Chinese consumers in spite of repeated warnings fro m 
the American government. Thus the 1995 TRIPS agreemen~ enabled countries like China, 
India, Brazil and Pakistan to avoid unil ateral imposition of sanction by the United States. 
These countri.es have more leverage under TRIPS because under TRIPS can defend their case 
in front of an independent panel. If a coun try violates a TRIPS regulation, the due process of 
Dispute Settlement Understandi ng (DSU) of the WT O is fo llowed. 
TRIPS was a result of un yie lding efforts by a coalition of business leaders in the 
United States to protect their profi ts against evolving competition from countries such as, 
China, India, Brazil , and countries of the former So viet Union. In particular, China 's 
accession to the WTO was delayed because of its perceived lack of willingness to confro nt 
the menace of piracy. China's request to enter the WTO as a developing country was rejected 
because that would have conferred on the country the privileges that developing countries 
enjoy at the WTO. For example, upon accedi ng to the WTO, developing coun tries are not 
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required to bring their tariff rate to conform to the standards of the WTO. Rather they are 
giving between 15 to 20 years to gradually reduce their tariff rate. 
This paper examines the impact of TRfPS on economic development in developing 
countries, in particular it examines whether provisions in the TRIPS agreement violate the 
spirit of WTO stated declaration of accelerating economic development in developing 
countries through flexible trade policy. The WTO has some provisions aimed at bolstering 
economic development of impoverished countries. Unlike advanced countries, article XVill 
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GAIT) regulation gives developing 
countries the right to control goods entering their ports. The purpose of this privilege is to 
protect developing countries against balance of payment deficit and to shield infant industries 
from competition abroad. 
When the TRIPS agreement was establi shed in 1995, no specific provisions were 
made to accommodate the special needs of developing countries. It was only after six years 
of TRIPS that WTO members begun to realize the adverse effects of the pol icy on economies 
of developing countries. In particular TRIPS has adversely affected the economies of 
developing countries through lack of access to essential drugs and agricultural processes. 
Effects of TRIPS on developing countries were one of the major foc uses of the WTO 
mjnisterial meeting in Doha in 2001. Declarations 17, 18, and 19 were devoted to TRIPS. 
Among other things, the declarations stated that TRIPS should be used "in a manner 
supportive of public health, by promoting both access to existing medicine and research and 
development into medicines". In a separate declaration, the WTO not only granted 
compulsory license to member countries to manufacture li fe savi ng drugs, it a lso recognized 
that countries that do not have the modem technology to produce these essential drugs under 
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compulsory license should be assjsted. Though the type of assistance that should be given 
was not made clear. This vague assurance has not materialized because developing countries 
in dire need of essential drugs are still not allowed under WTO rule to import generic drugs 
from other developing countries. 
This paper analyzes the economic impact of TRIPS on developing countries, 
especially the least developed countries. The paper examines whether TRIPS hinders 
economic development in the most impoverished countries. Any trace of under development 
in the least developed countries that could be attributed to TRIPS is unintended because those 
countries were not the target of TRIPS, since the basic motivation of TRIPS was to reduce 
trade in counterfeit goods produced by some specific countJies, most importantly China. 
Today, the major concern of most governments of LDCs on TRIPS is not so much about 
their inability to control copyright infringement but much about having access to drugs for its 
ailing citizens. Pharmaceutical companies in the United States and other developed countries 
hold the patents for drugs that are used to treat tropical diseases such malaria and 
tuberculosis, and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). When The TRIPS 
agreement was signed in 1995 there was no indication that it would be a source of contention 
between developed and developing countries. In an apparent show of goodwill towards poor 
countries, the members of the WTO came to an agreement in 2001 to enable the poor 
countries to manufac ture patented drugs under certain emergency conditions for its citizens. 
The flaw in thi s provision is that it was assumed that all developing countries are capable of 
producing these sophisticated drugs by themselves. Few developing countries, like Brazil, 
India, and Argentina have the capability to produce these drugs. The export of these drugs to 
other developing countries is not allowed by the WTO due to a strong opposition from the 
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pharmaceutical companies in the developed countries. Pharmaceutical companies object to 
authorizing the export of drugs manufactured under compulsory license because by allowing 
other countri e to import drugs from other developing countries under the emergency rule, 
these drugs may end up in the developed countries, thereby curtailing the sales and profits of 
the pharmaceutical companies. Most of the countries that cannot utilize the compulsory 
license rule frequently experience macroeconomic instabi lity such as inflation and high rate 
of unemployment. Since TRIPS is mostl y dri ven by commercial interests of individual 
producers in advanced countries, a careful evaluation is needed. In thi s paper, we determine a 
country's wi llingness to pay for a patent product based on its per capita GDP. It fo llows that 
countries with the highest per capita GDP are expected to pay more for a patented product 
than a middle-income country. Middle-income countries are expected to exhibit greater 
willingness to pay than least developed countries. It is recognized that TRJPS has ethical 
consequences: whether it is acceptable for the world to allow human tragedy that has 
engulfed countries in Southern Africa and other parts of the world to perpetuate when the 
marginal cost of reducing the suffering is small. This ethical issue could be debated in other 
disciplines. This paper shows that by employing price discri mination among countries, patent 
holders are going to be better off than the current situation where developing countries are 
made to invoke the compulsory license rule to vio late patent right. 
JPR enhances Rand D which bring about innovation. Investors in R and D wi ll 
continue to invest in so far as they make profit to cover the huge cost. It has been shown that 
the bulk of the sales of phrumaceutical products come from the advanced countries. IPR for 
music, electronic gadgets, trade secrets, trademarks need no modification because the 
compulsory license rule of the WTO may never apply. On the other hand applying the stri ct 
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rules of TRIPS to pharmaceutica ls and biotechnology defeats the very concessions that 
WTO members have given to least LDCs. The argument that without IPR every innovation 
becomes a common property is untenable in the case of pharmaceutical drugs for poor 
countries. Their consumption of phaimaceutical drugs with patent is close to zero. Global 




The debate over IPR dates back to nineteen century. In his book, The Principle of 
Pol itical Economy, the nineteenth century British economist John Stuart Mills ( 1900) argued 
that the critic ism against the monopoli st should not be extended to inc lude the patent holder. 
His reason was that a patent conferred some privi leges on the inventor whose innovation 
increases the welfare of the consumer. In hi s opinion, patent should not be equated to 
monopoly because the latter reduces the welfare of the consumer whereas patent increases 
the welfare of consumers because a patent moti vates producers to come out with an entirely 
new product that benefi ts consumers. 
T he 1995 agreement on TRIPS under WTO was not the first international 
agreement on IPR. A precursor of TRIPS was the 1883 Paris convention for the protection of 
Industrial Property. Copyright has been protected s ince the Berne convention in 1886. In 
1967, a conference was held in Stockholm, Sweden that that obliged countri es to confer on 
ci ti zens of other countries the patent rights of its own citizens. Other IPR protection treati es 
were Patent Cooperation Treaty which was signed in 1979 to enable inventors to fi le for the 
patent rights for the same invention in different countries 
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2.1 Market Failure Argument in Favor of TRIPS 
The concept of IPR contraructs the fundamental economic concept of perfect 
competi tion. Under ideal ci rcumstances, perfect competition is preferable to any form of 
imperfect market structure, be it monopoly, monopoli stic competition , duopoly or o ligopoly. 
Critics of IPR contend that there is always welfare loss under imperfect competi ti on. 
Proponents of strong IPR, however, argue along the line of publ ic good. A public good has 
two main characteri sti cs . It is non-ri valry, which means that one person's consumption of it 
would not prevent another person from consuming the same good. It is non excludable, that 
is consumers who want to consume the good cannot be denied access. T he publ ic good 
represents a classic case of market failure because a public good is associated with a social 
cost that would not be borne by participants in a free market transaction (Cease, 1960). An 
indi vidual will not readily pay for a public good. Patent is regarded as a public good because 
once the di scovery of the processes of making a product is made, it would be impossible to 
prevent others from using that knowledge without paying for it. This is known as free riding. 
The problem of free rirung leads to under production of any good that can be classified as 
public good. It has been suggested that pharmaceutical companies should be given the 
protection of IPR. In a study published by Tuft Center for the Study of Drug Development 
and published in 200 1, it was estimated that on average, the cost of developing a new drug is 
$802 million over a 12 year period (Berndt, 2002). This figure is two times more than the 
$350 mill ion that was estimated a decade ago. The implication is that the cost o f discovering 
a new drug is increasing very fast. A worldwide ex tension of patent as granted by TRIPS 
would be the ri ght move to help innovators to recoup their large investment. 
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Using R and D on pharmaceuti cals as an example, Kremer (2002) conculTed with the 
need to motivate innovators by statjng that R and D on new pharmaceuticals is in short 
suppl y because the competitive markets do not provide enough incentives for R and D 
expenditures. The traditional solution of governments stepping in to provide the social public 
good is not applicable because governments in various countries face the free rider problem 
of supplying thi s public good. 
However, Deardoff (1992) devised a model where limiting the jurisdiction of a patent 
geographicall y does not discourage investment in R and D. In Deardorff's view, absence of 
international legislation that will protect a patent across international borders wi ll not stifle 
innovation as other researchers have clai med. A foreign country merely serves as a market 
for an innovated product. In high technology sectors innovaUon is regarded as a cumulative 
process that depends on previous work (Gal lini, 2002). Current research always dwel ls on 
previous research, therefore strict IPR protection would prevent future researchers improving 
upon past innovations (O 'Dongue et al, 1998). Falvey et al (2005) consider a simple case 
where R and D has brought about discovery of a new product. Economic theory suggests that 
for a socially optimal output to be produced, the product should be sold at a price equal to its 
marginal cost. Under this setting, society will deri ve the highest social surplus possible. 
Assuming no fixed cost, the innovator does get zero economic profit. Since it cost millions of 
dollars to come out wi th a new product, firms will not have the incentive to invest in Rand D 
when they can only make zero profi t. A solution to this zero profi t problem is to grant patent 
tights to innovators. A patent gives the patent holder a temporary ri ght to make economic 
profit. Once the patent expires product enters the competiti ve market. 
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The argument that a stronger protection for intellectual property ri ghts across 
international borders impedes economic growth in the deve loping countries received mixed 
reviews from Easterly (200 1). Isolating the factors that enhance economic growth in the 
developing coun tries is a daunting task. Past policies aimed at accelerating economic growth 
have failed. Generous aid from the advanced countries to the developing countries is not a 
solution. Therefore, in the opinion of Easterly, one cannot argue that IPR protection works 
against the economic interest of developing countries. 
2.2 The Divergent Interests of Developed Countries and Developing Countries on 
TRIPS 
Developing countries view TRIPS as an instrument designed to limit their use of 
modem technology and life saving drugs. lt has also been found out that TRIPS increases 
prices of commodities because it increases the domestic monopoly power since the foreign 
patent holder must give license to a producer or ship the goods to a sole distributor abroad. 
Among other things, developing countries seek to undermine IPR treaties in order to have 
access to advanced technologies wi thout paying the required royalty fees (Sell , 1995). 
Before the current debate over the effect of TRIPS on the economy of the less 
affl uent countries, Chichi lnisky (J 994), pointed out that there is a vast difference between 
property rights in the South and the North . The South has weak property rights, whereas the 
North has well defi ned property iights. This difference has lead to pressure on environmental 
resources in the South. Due to strong property rights there is Jess pressure on environmental 
resources (Chichi lnisky, 1994). 
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Yet the single most important factor in the fast rise of the IPR protection across 
international borders stems from the use of threat of retali ation . The United States in put 
significant pressure on both developed and developing countries to conform to international 
treatjes on IPR. At various forums in the 1960's and 1970s, (this includes the World 
Intellectual Prope1ty Organization and UNCT AD) United States trade representatives 
bilaterally consulted its counterparts from Singapore, Hungary, Taiwan, and South Korea, 
over intellectual property rights violations. United States was not totally successful in 
persuading these countries to stringently protect intellectual property ri ghts. The United 
States government learned that the use of mild force was more effective than exhortation. An 
amendment to the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 in 1988 gave the Unjted States government 
the power to retaliate against any country that is perceived to violate intellectual property 
protection . (Sell, 1995) 
Developing countries, especiall y African countries have protested against the 
patentjng of life forrns and biological processes. TRIPS is vague on agricultural innovation. 
The TRIPS agreement does not offer specific IPR protection for plants and animal 
innovations. In United States, however, the landmark decision in 1980 of diamond v. 
Chakrabarty allowed patents in agricul tural processes. The United States Supreme Court 
ruled that patent could be obtained for any biological processes or invention due to human 
intervention. The Supreme Court rul ed again in J. E.M. Ag Supply Inc v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International Inc., that plants and plant seeds, whelher natural or artificial can be patented 
under United States law. (Janis and Kesan, 2002). Developing countries are, however, 
dissatisfied with these rulings. Farmers in Argentina, for instance can save patented seeds for 
replanting the next season whereas it is illegal in the United States because of the Supreme 
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Court ruling (Moschini , 2004). The United States Trade representatives are of the view that 
the Supreme Court ruling is in line with TRIPS provisions. On the other hand , developing 
countries have doubts. Their unease stems from the fact that patents of biotechnological 
innovations wi ll be the next agenda that will be di scussed at the WTO when TRIPS is 
analyzed for reforms and suggestions. Recall that it was the amendment of Section 301 of 
United States Trade and Tariff Act of 1994 that made it hard for foreign countries to fail to 
comply with intellectual property protection of United States patents in the respecti ve 
countries. By 1994 Section 301 has been incorporated into WTO regulation in the form of 
TRIPS. To developing countri es granting patents to plants and animals is not to their 
advantage. The belief is that substances and processes that occur in nature are a di scoveries 
and not inventions that should be patented . Famine due to poor harvest is major problem in 
developing countries. Most biotechnological seeds are drought resistance and high yield. 
Developing countries also tend to complain that they have not benefi ted much from 
TRIPS because the other party (developed countries) have not he ld their end of the bargain. 
This is because during the Uruguay round of trade negotiations, developing countri es were 
made to believe that acceptance and compliance with TRIPS would open the door for freer 
trade in agricu ltural goods and tex tiles. Yet, years after implementation of TRIPS, developed 
countries and developing countries at still at loggerheads on international trade in textile and 
agricultural products. Brazil has threatened to send United States to WTO over subsidy on 
cotton . 
These differences in inte rests between the developing and the deve loped world not 
withstanding, some researchers on protection of intellectual property right argue that patents 
are beneficial to both the North and the South (Richardson and Gaisford, 1996). In a two 
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country model comprising of No1th and South where the North has a firm capable of 
inventing a new product, and a South firm that has limited R and D capabilities, they pointed 
out that the length of patent in the North would be different from the length of patent in the 
South. The North and the South play a game in patent in which the patent in the South is 
conditional on the patent length in the North . A successful R and D will bring little 
immediate consumer surplus in the North as well as in the South. But both the North and the 
South gain considerable consumer surplus when the patent expires. 
In spite of the adverse effects of TRIPS on the economies of developing countries, 
some developing countries are relieved because they regarded the hitherto unilateral use of 
Section 30 l by United States as unfair. TRIPS to a greater degree works in favor of 
developed countries. Developing countries however are confident in the rule oriented policy 
of the Dispute Settlement Unit (DSU) of WTO because the DS U process allows developing 
countries to argue the merit of thei r case before an independent panel whereas prior to 
TRIPS, United States can impose a uni lateral trade sanction under the pretext of patent 
violation. (Okediji , 2005) 
It has also been noted that developing countri es are not keen on enforcing TRlPS in 
their respecti ve countries out of their own volition. In fact, Jack of domestic legislation to 
enforce TRIPS in developing countries has been iden tified as one of the mai n problems since 
the agreement was signed in 1995. The problem has partly arisen because the TRIPS 
agreement does not require countries to establish a special judicial and administrative set up 
to cover patent violation (Okediji, 2005). 
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2.3 Solving Piracy across In ternational Borders 
TRIPS came into being directly as a result of piracy in certain goods. It was the 
intemationaJ counterfeiting in products such as video games, computers (Apple and IBM), 
unauthorized recording of music and films, copying of computer software programs, reverse 
engineering of chips, and counterfeiting designer jeans that sparked the heated debate in the 
1980s on how to protect intellectual property across international borders (Russell ,1983). 
Patents violation can occur between two developing countries. In May of 2005 Pakistan's 
Federal Investi gation agency raided and recovered more than 100, 000 DVDs of Indian 
movies in Karachi. Raids such as these would not be frequent since the illegal production of 
copy right material s benefits Lhe economy of the pirate country. 
Globerman (1988) argues that strictly speaking, piracy does not have an adverse 
effect on the economy of the domestic country. This view suggests that piracy need not be 
controlled. Globerman argues that piracy is beneficial to foreign economy but poses no threat 
to the domestic economy where a patent originates. If there is a piracy of patented American 
products abroad, the only group that loses is the subsidiaries of American companies located 
overseas. Local firms take away profits from American subsidiaries. Globerman states that 
that counterfeiting of foreign goods protected by patents adversely affects the economjes of 
the pirated countries because piracy sti fles inflow of fore ign direct investment. The argument 
is that the existing market situation does more harm to coun tries with lax piracy rules. 
Choi (2005) argues that there is a distinction between authentic goods and counterfeit 
ones since counterfei t goods are traded in the black markets whereas the origi nal brands are 
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sold in legal markets. There are also di fferences in price between a genuine product and a 
counterfei t one. In addition, few consumers will pay the same price for a counterfeit good as 
they would pay for the original. In other words, consumers are not easily deceived into 
buying a counterfeit product. Assuming a counterfeit good has a positive marginal utility, 
consumers will purchase a counterfeit, good although it might be inferior in terms of quality 
to the original. An increase in producti on of a counterfeit good wi ll invariably result in the 
decrease in demand of the original good and vice versa since counterfeit good and authentic 
good are c lose substitutes. 
In a two-country model where the re is a domestic firm that produces a genuine brand, 
and a foreign firm that produces a counterfeit brand, assuming copyright is held by the 
domestic firm, counterfeit products flood the fore ign market due to differences in 
enforcement of intellectual property protection. According to Choi: 
The foreign government does not rigorously enforce copyrights and trademarks within its 
territory. Law enforcement is costly and the fore ign government has no incemive to crack 
down on counterfeiters contributing economies. Accordingly not all coumerfeiters are caught 
and prosecuted (Choi , 2005 pp 432). 
To solve the counterfeiting problem in countries with lax rules, C hoi suggests a novel 
approach since counterfeiting cannot be completely eradicated. Counterfeiters can pay fees. 
Patent holders may be wi lling to accept the tolerance fee si nce it increases their overal l profit 
and counterfeiters will readily accept thi s deal since it enables them to avoid prosecution and 
possible jail sentence and large fines . 
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T his suggestion is practica l, for all intents and purposes, considering the very recent 
deal that Microsoft Corporation has reached with the Indonesian government. After months 
of intensive negotiations, Microsoft Corporation in the first week of June 2005 reached a deal 
with the Indonesian government over piracy of Windows software. Under the deal , the 
Indonesian government will pay a token amount of $1 for every pirated window software on 
a government computer. In exchange for this agreement, the Indonesian government will buy 
the original software from Microsoft whenever it wants a new Microsoft program. The deal 
involved over 50, 000 government owned computers. The Indonesian Information minister 
was quoted as saying that Microsoft was being realistic since the Indonesian government 
lacked revenue to purchase authentic Microsoft product. 
Piracy is a growi ng problem in international trade in spite of the existence of TRIPS. 
The following table shows coun tries wi th leading piracy rate on computer software and other 
trademarks. 
Table 1. Countries with Highest Piracy Rates 






Source: Business Software Alliance (BSA) 
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Developing countri es cannot be forced to use patented software at all times, they may 
try to evade detection. Microsoft's dea l with Indonesia will enable the country to limit its use 
of pirated software. The same amnesty could be granted to other countries on the list with 
exception of China. A trade di spute between a United States based firm and the Chinese 
government is not going to be solved between the firm and the government as Microsoft has 
done. Rather the issue would be resolved through governmental negotiation or through the 
DSU of WTO because of the strategic position of China to the United States. China is the 
United States largest trading partner after Japan. Due to the growing United States' trade 
deficit with China, China 's accession to the WTO was de layed because The European Union 
and the United States refused China's request to be admitted to the WTO as a developing 
country. Accession as a developing country would have given C hina ample years to comply 
with WTO tariff structures. U nited States scathingly critic ized China repeatedly from 1994 to 
1996 over non-compliance with IPR protection (Eglin , J 997) The United Stales is very 
particular about China because Lhe United States ' trade deficit with China is huge. The vaJue 
of United States' export to C hina rose from $5.8 billion in 1989 to $26. l billion in 2003. 
During the same pe riod the value o f United States' import from C hina increased from 11.9 
billion to $ 157. l billion. United States' trade deficit thus grew from a moderate 20.3 billion 
in 1989 to $ 119.5 billion in 2003 (Scot, 2005) 
China's population size and trade volume would make it eligible for accession only 
on commercial basis. The extension of amnesty covering piracy is an ambiguous move 
because it has been observed that weak patent protection in foreign countries can reduce 
United States exports (Smith , 2002). On the other hand a strong foreign IPR protection 
increases United States exports to countries with high rate of pi racy. The result also showed 
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that United States exports c:timinish when there is a stronger IPR in countries that are less 
li kely to violate patent right. The Microsoft decision is a step in the right direction , though 
the Economist (2003) has projected that with counterfeiti ng and piracy on the increase in 
China and in other emerging economies of the fo rmer Soviet Union , there is no end in sight 
for piracy and that the problem is going to become a global business. It is however ironic that 
the products that have been generating heated debate over TRIPS are not the ones that the 
most impove1ished countries on earth care aboul. TRIPS to some extent has been useful in 
combating piracy because of the threat those countries that violate IPR wil l be sent to WTO. 
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Chapter 3. 
Ethical Problems Associated with TRIPS 
The debate over TRIPS and its negati ve impact on economies of developing and least 
developing countries borders on ethics as we ll as economics. On the ethical side of the 
debate, it is often asked whether millions of impoverished people in the Sou th should die 
from treatable di seases such as tuberculosis, malaria, and AIDS when the marginal cost of 
keeping chem heal th y and productive is so smal l. New drugs that are more effective in 
treating T uberculoses and malari a are patented. Should agricuJtural research and processes 
that could save millions of people from starvation and death be patented? With regard to 
pharmaceutical companies and health crises in the developing countries, critics have stated 
that ethically minded pharmaceutical companies in the developed countries should adopt the 
Rawlsian theory of distributive justice. That is life saving drugs should be made avai lable to 
people who need them because those drugs are a p1imary social good. UNAIDS, the United 
Nations agency responsible for monitoring AIDS issues has reported that there are about 36 
million people currently suffering from the disease. 22 mi llion people have already died of 
the disease. It is estimated that 10 percent of the adult population in sub Saharan Africa has 
the di sease. In countries such as South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe more than 25 
percent of the adu lt population carry the di sease. AIDS sufferers are not usually accorded the 
compassion and empathy of victims of other diseases and natural disasters. T hey are not even 
considered victims because of the mode of transmission of the disease. AIDS is transmitted 
mainly through unprotected sex with a carrier of the disease or through intravenous drug use. 
Sufferers are therefore seen as victims of their own reckless actions. 
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The United Nations Human Development lndex (HDI) clearly shows that there is a 
posi ti ve correlation between economic growth and li fe expectancy. Li fe expectancy could be 
used as a proxy fo r the health status of c itizens of a country. lt follows logically that since 
AIDS reduces the li fe expectancy of countries that are severely affected, the disease wil l 
definitely slow down economic growth. However some critics see the picture dj fferently in 
spite of the te rrible human tragedy. Young (2004) did an analysis and concluded that the 
AIDS epidemic in Southern Africa will adversely affect the human capital accumulation of 
orphaned children in the short run . But in the long run , Young c laimed that the long term 
effect of the epidemic is positjve because labor becomes scarce, fe1tility rate is lowered due 
to shortage of women through death, and reluctance to have unprotected sex, thereby leading 
to high per capita accumulation in the future. This analysis, however, is flawed because it 
assumed the problem wi ll go away with time. In reality there is not much evidence to support 
the notion that the AIDS c ri sis in Southern Africa would in the long run be beneficial when 
there is no end in s ight of a cure. He could have used biological model of a progression of a 
disease before a cure is found. Small pox among Nati ve Americans is a good example. 
Activists ' resolve to campaign to make li fe saving drugs access ible to the 
impoverished make ethjcal sense but has no economic appeal. The pharmaceutical companies 
are not going to be persuaded by emotional appeal to reduce the price of drugs fo r developing 
countries. Biotechnological companies in the advanced countries will not freely provide 
patented seeds to poor countries on the verge of famine. The next chapter analyzes economic 
theory to fi nd solutions to the adverse effect of TRJPS on developing countries. The ethica l 
issues could be debated in other di scipline such as philosophy or bioethics. In the nex t 




This section analyzes two main ways in which TRIPS works against the economic 
interests of developing countries and why some developing countries are able to use threats 
to force a change in behavior of patent holders. Other developing countries that are 
categorized among the most impoverished countries are incapable of forcing any concession 
from patent holders because they do not pose any credible threat. Granting patents to 
agribusiness firms in the developed countries have a negative impact on the economies of 
developing count1ies. Price discrimination is used as a model to resolve the two pressing 
issues of access to pharmaceutical drugs and agricultural processes. 
Price discrimination is a topic well studied in microeconomics literature. Assume 
arbitrage is illegal and therefore impossible, we show that patent holders can maximize profit 
by practicing price di scrimination in the international market. Rather than allowing 
pharmaceutical firms in the developing countries to invoke compulsory license rule to viol.ate 
patent, patent holders in the advanced countiies can practice price discrimination. 
Under imperfect competition where market participants can influence price and 
quantity, economic theory assumes that market pa1ticipants recognize the need of their 
interdependence, resulting in a price that is equitable to all parties. However, this assumption 
is not applicable to TRIPS negotiation. For example a third world farmer who wants to utHize 
a patented a bio-engineered seed cannot negotiate directly with the patent owner in the 
United States. The negotiation is done through governmental representatives at the WTO. 
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4.1 Political Economy Issues 
Hayami (1998) has demonstrated that politicians in developed countries pay special 
attention to the demands of special interest groups like industrial capitalists and farmers. The 
political survival of po)jticians depends on the eJectoral success, which in tum depends on 
political support from the interest groups. In developed countries like United States, Britain, 
and Germany where democracy is practiced, politicians' marginal revenue of pursuing a 
trade policy is measured by expected increase in electoral votes of those who wi ll benefit 
from the policy. The number of votes that the politicians lose from those who oppose a 
policy measures the marginal cost. Marginal benefit to the politicians for implementing a 
policy, therefore, is the net expected increase in electoral votes. Marginal loss is the expected 
decrease in votes. Often, politicians in developed countries weigh trade policy based on 
expectation of political support. 
On the other hand politician in most developing countries, with possible exception of 
India, China, and Brazil and other middle-income countries, do not base trade decisions on 
po)jtical support from voters. Decisions are often made based on tribal influences. Besides, 
Least Developed Countries' (LDCs) politic.ians do not have much leverage to negotiate a 
trade treaty in the international arena. They have a weak bargaining position because even if 
they issue a threat in the course of bargaining for a fair trade deal , this threat is not credible 
due lack of political pressure from their own citizens. There is lack of social and political 
upheaval in the wake of an unpopular trade decision in a third world country. Often people 
who will benefit much from the relaxation of the TRIPS rules are lowly educated and remain 
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ignorant about local politics let alone the bargaining process at the WTO. For these third 
world countries, a prisoner's dilemma model cannot be used to explain the issue. 
4.2 A Game Theoretic Approach 
The bargaining position of LDCs under TRIPS is in sharp contrast to developing 
countries such as Brazil, India, and China. Okediji (2005) notes that in most least developed 
countries, domestic political momentum is likely to influence compliance with TRIPS 
whereas developing countries might not comply. Those countries have advanced medical and 
agricultural laboratories that are capable of manufacturing patented drugs and seeds. The 
bargaining process can be presented using the following pay off matrix: 












The underlying assumptions are: there are two countries, developed and developing. 
Patent is held by firms in the developed country. When a developed country negotiates to 
supply the commodity at a reduced price, threat from a developing country is not credible. 
WTO regulation allows compulsory license for pharmaceuticals, but jn this game it is 
assumed that the compulsory license rule also covers patented agricultural process. 
Under the 1995 WTO regulations on TRIPS member countries are required to comply 
with IPR that is enforced in other countries. Thus a firm in country A cannot manufacture a 
product that is patented in country B without obtaining a license. Under WTO rule, patent 
holders are given maximum of 20 years to possess the sole right to exploit their inventions. 
By thfa rule the patent holders become monopolists, which means that they have the market 
power to determine prices. Since patent holders are the sole producers of the commodity, 
buyers in the developed world as well as developing countries consumers should pay 100% 
of the price of the monopolist patent holder. This is depicted in the northwest part of the 
matrix. An invocation of the WTO emergency rule means that a developing country can 
produce a commodity covered by patent without the permission from the license holder. This 
is referred to as compulsory license. In this scenario, the developing country will 
manufacture the commodity and seJI it at price that is around 20% of the patent price to its 
citizens. This is indicated in the southwest part of the pay off matrix. Ignoring transportation 
cost, if the price of the domestic producer is equal or above the marginal cost of the patent 
holder, then the advanced country will negotiate and sell the product to the developing 
country at lower price rather than allowing the developing country to produce the commodity 
itself. This information is shown in the northeast comer of the matrix, where the patent 
holder in advanced country is hypothetically willing to negotiate to supply the commodity at 
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30% of the monopolist price to the developing country consumer. The outcome of the 
negotiation shows that both the developed country and the developing country accept the 
30% of the monopoly price. Revenue goes to the patent holder since no compulsory license 
is used. The southeast part of the matri x indicates a hypothetical situation where the patent 
holder negotiates to suppl y the commodity at a reduced price of 30% of the original price. 
Here there could be a threat to violate the patent, but the threat is not credible due to the 
assumption that a negotiation leads to patent holder lowering the price to an acceptable level. 
The potenti a l domestic producer receives 0% of the ori gi nal price since the domestic 
producer does not get the opportunity to suppl y any generic product to the market. Clearly in 
Lhis game the patent holders are better of negotiating and suppl yi ng the product at a reduced 
price. 
This game is applicable to the practical challenges posed by the TRIPS agreement 
when it comes to developing countries access to essential drugs to treat disease such as 
malaria and IDV. ln 2001, the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Hoffman La Roche reduced the 
cost of IDV drug, Yiracept by, 40% when the Brazilian government threatened the firm that 
Brazil wi ll invoke the compulsory license rule to produce the drug domesticall y. Hoffman La 
Roche reduced the price of the drug from $1.07 to $0.64. Brazi l has been savi ng$ 35.4 
million a year. Brazi l' s threat would have opened Lhe floodgate for other pharmaceutical 
companies in the developing world to produce their own patented drugs. In the same year the 
United States filed and dropped a suit against Brazil because of the latter' s intention to 
manufacture AIDS drugs patented by American pharmaceutical companies. The American 
wi thdrawal was due to the fact that Brazil had a stronger case backed by WTO legislation. 
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4.3 TRIPS and Famine in Least Developing Countries 
Apart from the dispute over the right to produce patented drugs, another issue that 
might in the future cause the WTO to deliberate on is the copyrights of bio-engineered seeds. 
Unlike patents for such items like music, watches, and computers where no country can get a 
compulsory license from the WTO, the case for bio-engineered seed is formidable. Already 
there is a growing di spute over patented bio engineered seeds, and some plants. In particular, 
African countries are at the forefront of the crusade to prevent agribusiness firms in the 
developed world to possess any agricultural based patent. The position of African countries is 
that no patent should be granted to any life forms and natural processes. Africa has 
informed WTO of its intention to achieve food security. So far, the WTO only grants 
compulsory licenses to manufacture pharmaceutical drugs to combat diseases that are a threat 
to public health in developing countries such as malaria, AIDS, and typhoid. But there is a 
high likelihood that due to famine in Africa and other arid areas of the world, developing 
countries will negotiate for a change in the TRIPS treaty so that they will have the right to 
use patented drought resistance seeds in order to combat famine. A look at some of these 
countries paints a grim picture. In 2004, 30 million people in ten African countries: 
Mauritania, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Mozambique, 
and Zimbabwe were on the verge of famine that could kill more than 30 million people. 
Developed countries as well as developing countries came to consensus in 2001 to 
modify the TRIPS agreement because its provisions posed a public heal th threat to the 
developing countries. A critical look at famine in the developing world would raise similar 
alarm. A future show down between advanced countries and developing countries over 
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TRIPS by be imminent. According to 1998 State of the Children Report published by the 
United Nations: 
Malnutrition nearly contribwes co 7 millioll child deaths every year, more than any infectious 
disease, war or natural disaster. 
Based on this statement one can assert that the case for the relaxation of TRIPS 
regulation on patent of biological organism and agricultural processes would be stronger than 
the argument that was advanced in 2001 to support the ease in regulation of TRIPS so that 
developing countries and Jess developed countries can have access to pharmaceutical 
products from the developed world. In the 200 I special "Declaration on Public Health and 
Developing Coun tries", declaration 1 of the WTO ministerial meeting states that: 
We recognize the gravity of public health problem affecting many developing. and least 
developed countries especially those resulting from HIV/AJDS. tuberculosis, Malaria, and 
other epidemics 
What needs to be analyzed is whether famine in these countries presents a looming 
threat, greater that the devastating effects of these diseases, thereby making it plausible to 
invoke WTO rules that empower countries to violate the terms of a patent. Specifically 
declaration Five Con public health states that: 
Each Member lw s the right to determine what constitwes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including 
those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis. malaria and other epidemics, can represent a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
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A careful look at famine in LDCs shows the dire consequence of hunger is close to 
being referred to as "a national emergency or other extreme urgency". The charts below 
show the grain production in one of the most famine-afflicted region of the world, Hom of 
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Although armed conflicts, drought, and other political instabi lity might account for 
low production of cereals, the output level could be increased with a drought resistant hybrid 
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seeds. Most of these countries have had an annual population growth rate of over 3 percent 
per annum. Yet cereal production, which is staple in these countries, has not increased to 
commensurate wi th rapid population growth . A look at fig. l above indicates that grain 
production stays 18,500,000 tons in 1992/1993 season as 199111992 season. In the 
1993/1994 season there was a slump in the production of grains. Grain production decreased 
from 18,500,000 tons in the previous season to 17,000,000 in the 1993/1 994 season. Fig 1 
shows that although there was a slight increase in grain production in this region from 
1993/1994 to 1995/ 1996, the increase in production is evidently patchy. 
The overall picture drawn, shows lack of growth in the grain production. This low average 
production of grains has lead to serious health consequences. Starvation always leads to 
diseases. In Africa and other developing countries, women and children are known to be 
deficient in a number of micronutrients. In addition, people from famine-afflicted areas suffer 
from death as a consequence of eating unbalanced diet. Amartya Sen, (1984) a leading 
authority on famine has argued that none of the functioning democracies has experienced 
famine since 1820. His argument implies that the WTO call for the protection of economic 
and social interests of developing countries through a series of policies might be mere lip 
service if there are constraints, such as TRIPS, which inadvertently block the least 
developing countries from having access to high quality bio-engineered seeds to combat 
famine in the developing world. 
It would be naively simple to suggest that famine in developing countries will be 
completely e liminated if TRIPS does not interfere with access to agii culture technology in 
these countries. The fact of the matter is that low rainfall , poor soil structure, poor farming 
method as well as wars contribute to famine. But some of the provisions pertain ing to TRIPS, 
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contrary to WTO aims and objectives of assisting in economic development jn the most 
impoverished part of the world, could harm economic development in these areas. 
Achieving self-sufficiency in food production is the goal of many developing 
countries. In reality, thi s goal has eluded many developing coun tries as the chart below 
shows. The chart shows thousands of tons of foreign cereals that entered the horn of Africa 
from 1983 to 2000. It includes both foreign food a.id and direct import. 
Fig. 3 Horn of Africa: cereal Commercial imports and Food Aid 
( 1983i84, 1984185' 1991 i92-1999/2000) 
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Compared with Chart 1, it is seen that dependence on foreign cereal supply hinges on 
domestic harvest. Whenever the domestic supply of cereals goes down, countries in this 
region procure more foreign grain to supplement the scanty local production. For example in 
the 1999/2000 season when cereal production fell short of the of the 1998/1999 production 
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level, more foreign cereals entered the region in the 1999/2000 season than it did in the 
1998/1999season. 
Already, the comparative advan tage that the developing countries have in internationaJ 
trade over developed countries is being undermined by the agricultural policies of these 
advanced countries. The European Union has its Common Agricultural Policy. The mainstay 
of this policy is governmental subsidy to European farmers to make European agriculture 
more competitive to the rest of the world. Not only the European Union but the United States 
also gives massive subsidies to its farmers, thereby impeding agricultural development in the 
developing world. The impediment comes in the form of a1tificially low world market prices 
due to the subsidies. 
Brazil , for instance, has twice taken the United States and European Union to the 
Dispute Settlement Unit of the WTO over massive subsidies to farmers. In 2004 Brazil won 
an important case against the European union over subsidies given to sugar beet farmers. In 
the same year, the DSU ruled that United States subsidies to cotton farmers were in 
contravention with WTO rules. Thus, there are contentious issues between the advanced 
countries and the developed counuies. Developing countries think that they are at the 
receiving end of an unfair trade practice from the developed world. Developing countties 
want to see TRIPS not as a tool to hamper trade, but unfortunately there are complications. 
Currently, the interference of TRIPS in agriculture pales into insignificance in 
comparison to the dispute over access to pharmaceutical drugs. An attempt was made to get 
data on the marginal. cost of production of antiretroviral drugs and other drugs that are used 
to treat diseases that are prevalent in developing countries. It is easier to get the market price 
of these drugs. Pharmaceutical companies also state the cost of R and D that goes into 
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developing and manufacturing the drugs. Data on marginal cost are hard to come by. Perhaps 
pharmaceutical companies are uncomfortable with the negative publicity that the publication 
of the data will generate. 
The following table, however, shows the massive price difference between some 
brand name AIDS drugs and its genetic counterpart 
Table 2. Prices of Name Brand and Generic Brand Of Anti Retroviral Drugs 
Product Price sold to SA WHO approved generic 
Private Sector (in US dollars) (in US dollars) 
AZT (300mg) 674.52 180.00 
Limuvidine (150 mg) 741.59 100.0 
AZT/Limuvidine (300/150 mg) 926.98 265.00 
Nevirapine (200 mg) 417.14 166.00 
AZT Solution 528.14 160.60 
Larnivudine Solution 408.47 113.88 
Source: Treatment Action Campaign. (South Africa) 
The table shows that in all of these antiretroviral drugs, the price of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) approved generic drug is far lower than the price of the brand name. 
Nevirapine (200 mg) has the highest generic price compared with the brand name. Yet the 
generic price of nevirapine constitutes only 40 % of the price of the brand name. The 
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cheapest generic drug is limuvidine (150 mg). The price of this drug is just 10% of the brand 
name. 
Not all developing countries have a well functioning pharmaceutical industry capable 
of producing these antiretroviraJ drugs. Since there is no difference between the chemical 
components of the brand name and the generic drug, it is reasonable to assume that the 
marginal cost of producing a brand name drug and generic drug are equal. Since the generic 
drug producers are willing to supply the drugs at the WHO approved prices, it is assumed 
that the market price covers the marginaJ cost and a possible profit is earned. 
4.4 Segmented Market 
Patent-holders in bio-engineered seeds and brand drugs used to treat epidemics in the 
developing world can earn maximum profit if they could be successful in selling their 
products in segmented markets. TRIPS confers de facto monopoly powers on patent-holders. 
Free entry into the market is barred because a producer needs an authorization from the 
patent holder. As monopolists, patent holders under TRIPS can maximize profits by equating 
marginal revenue to marginal cost. 
Assume the manufacturer of a patented drug or seed can sell to individual buyers 
according to each person 's willingness to pay. This will eliminate any trace of consumer 
surplus and the producer will earn the highest profit available. But this strategy which is 
known as perfect price di scri mjnation or price discrimination of a first degree is not 
achievable because it would be improbable for the patent holders to ascertain each 
consumer's willingness to pay. Rather we can separate the market of a patented drugs or 
seeds into three distinct markets: 
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1.Demand by consumers in developed countries. 
2.Demand by consumers in developing countries. 
3.Demand by consumers in least developed countries. 
The first market is represented by consumers in countries like United State, Canada, 
Japan and most countries in Europe. The second market is represented by consumers in 
countries like India, China, Brazil, Thai land, and South Africa. The third market is 
represented by consumers in the most impove1ished countries of the world such as Ethiopia, 
Somalia Kenya, Burkina Faso, and Siena Leone. These segmented markets are based on the 
per capita GDP of the countries. Burkina Faso, for example is among the most impoverished 
countries in the world. Below is a per capita GDP data on countries in the various segmented 
market. This was compiled from Human Development Index (HDI) 2004 data. 
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Table 3. Per Capita Income of Countries in the Three Segmented Markets 
Developed Countries GDP in US Dollars (PPP) 
United States 35,750 
Japan 26,940 
Norway 36,600 
Bri tain 26,150 
Germany 27,100 




South Africa 10,070 
Malaysia 9,120 
Least Developed Countries GDP in US Dollars (PPP) 
Burkina Faso 1,100 
SietTa Leone 520 
Tanzania 580 
Ethiopi a 780 
Eri trea 890 
Source: World Bank (Human Development Index 2004) 
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The data show that different countries have different purchasing power. Sierra Leone, the 
country with smallest per capita GDP on this table has per capita GDP that is just l.42% of 
the per capita GDP of Norway. For the patent holders to make maxim profit, they must price 
the patented product differently in di fferent markets. Assume the demand curve facing patent 
holders is linear, assume aJso that the marginal cost of the patented product is fixed. Then we 
will have the segmented market shown below. 













Since perfect price di scrimjnation is beyond the reach of the patent holders, a more 
practical approach is to use the per capita GDP data to segment the market as above. Market 
segmentation becomes necessary because the manufacturers cannot exploit a demand 
function that does not exist (Henderson and Quandt, 1980). In this model , patent holders can 
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get the highest price for a product in market A where the demand for the product is more 
ine lastic than market B and market C. 0 2 is relati vely inelastic to D3. This implies that P1 > P2 
> P3. T otal pro fit in developed countries is given by area U. Total profi t in developing 
countries is equi valent to area V . Area W represents total profit in developing countries. 
Even though Q1 < Q2< Q3, U>V>W because of Lhe high price differences between the 
markets. 
Assume constant marginal cost, p1ice in each market is set according to the inverse elasti city 
rule given by 
(1) or 
(2) 
Where P; and Pj are the prices charged in market i and}. Price e lasticity of demand in market 
i andj are given by e1 and ej respectively. The segmented market pricing policy shows that 
profit maximizing price will be greater in a market with an ine lastic demand than a market 
with e lastic demand (Nicholson, J 998). Assume ej = -5 and e; = -2 then Pi/ Pj = 815. This 
means that price will be three-fifths higher in the inelasti c market than the more elastic 
market. 
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Thus in Fig. 4, market A which represents a market in developed countries, the 
demand curve is relatively inel astic, the gap between price and marginal revenue is higher 
than the gap between price and marginal revenue in market B which represents the 
developing countries. Then the gap between marginal revenue and price in market C is less 
than the gap between marginal revenue and price in market B. Clearly more profit is made 
in market A fo llowed by market B. Profit maximization requires that the patent holders 
supply Q1 in market 1, Q2 in market 2 and Q3 in market 3. 
This analysis is in line wi th Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA) survey that indicates that the people in the poorest regions of the world consume 
less pharmaceutical drugs compared with consumers in regions wi th advanced economies as 
table 4 shows. 
Table 4. World Pharmaceutical market, Sales by Region, 2000 
Region Percentage of Market 
United 39.6 
States 











Source: Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). 
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The data show that the market for pharmaceuticals is concentrated in high income countries 
followed by middle income countries. The impoverished regions of the world consume the 
tinniest fraction of the world's pharmaceuticaJs. In fact, Connecticut's spending on 
pharmaceuticals is greater than the total amount that the 38 countries that comprise of Sub 
Saharan Africa spend on pharmaceuticals (World Bank, 2001: U.S. Census, 2000) 
There is a caveat, however, to price disc1imination . If patent holders perceive that a 
lowering of the p1ice of a patented product to the developing countries wi ll lead to agitation 
for a lower price in the developed countries, then they will be less willing to voluntarily 
reduce the price. 
4.5 Cost of Production 
Developing countries that are capable of producing a patented product have low cost 
production. Labor cost is extremely low in these countries as indicated by the low per capita 
income. Pharmaceutical companies can take advantage of this low wage rate and establish 
firms that will manufacture the patented products. 
This low wage rate in developing countries, compared with the high wage rate in 
advanced countries is often the factor that leads to counterfeiting. Developing countries have 
comparative advantage in the production of counterfeit goods. This low cost more than 
compensate for the legal cost of producing counterfeiti ng. 
Firms outsource to reduce the cost of production so as to make more profit. If a 
developing country has a well-developed infrastructure to produce a patented product then , 
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the patent owner must consider establishing a subsidiary company abroad. This will protect 
the patent against unauthorized use. 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
A practi cal solution is to use the method already in place .in the United States. Drug 
manufacturers in the United States do not have a uni form price for drugs. The lowest 
prescription drugs sales are made to the Department of Veterans' Affairs and Department of 
Defense (Frank, 2002). In Europe prescription drug arbitrage is allowed. Prices that are 
charged by brand manufacturers to government health care providers in less affluent in 
southern part of Europe are low. Whereas arbitrage is allowed in Europe, in the United 
States, The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 clearly prohibited hospitals and other 
third parties from reselling the drugs that they have negotiated at a lower p1ice. This law bars 
any form of arbitrage. Apart from personal use, thi s same law does not allow for re 
importation of prescription drugs sold to other countries by Uni ted States drug companies 
(Berndt, 2002). In much the same way, governments of the least developing countries, which 
lack the technical capability to manufacture essential drugs, may negotiate drug prices wi th 
international pharmaceutical companies. 
TRIPS is now at a crossroads. T he issue here is whether patent holders in the 
advanced countries will continue pressu1ing thei r governments to enforce the strict 
international ru les. TRIPS allows a coun try to authorize its pharmaceutical firm to produce a 
patented drug under compulsory li cense without consulting the foreign patent holder. But the 
supply of a product under compulsory license is confined to the domestic market alone. This 
limitation was designed specifically to prevent countries such as Brazil and India, two 
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countries that have large phannaceuticaJ companies, to export patented drugs to other 
developing countries. (American Journal of International Law, 2003) 
What has to be taken into account is that patent is not developed specifically for a 
product that would be sold in a foreign market, it is granted locally. The patent holders main 
concern should be the prevention of arbitrage. The advanced countries possess enormous 
amount of market power in international trade, access to the market of advanced countries in 
particular, is critical to many developing countries. One would expect that the advanced 
countries would have more influence on trade negotiations. There is the need to reform the 
provisions of TRIPS so that WTO's main goal of achieving accelerated economic 
development in developing countries through international trade can be achieved. 
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